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The Effects of China's OneChild Policy: The Significance
for Chinese Women
Kristine Sudbeck
Abstract: In 1979. China introduced the legislation of the One-Child
Policy to be implemented as a temporary means of curbing such high
population growth. Over thirty years have passed since its
implementation. and this family planning policy still continues to be
controversial. Much of academia has focused on the problems
stemmingfrom this policy. such as increased abortions. the
underreporting of live births. infants abandoned and/or left at
orphanages. female infanticide and an imbalanced ratio of males to
females among the Chinese population. Not much scholarship has
focused on the benefits of China 's One-Child Policy. especially for
women. Since this policy 's implementation. China has experienced
changes in filial piety and patrilineality. In a land where sons have
been highly cherishedfor thousands ofyears. singleton daughters are
now experiencing greater parental investment and consequently
greater gender equality within their society. In a country that has been
traditionally dominated by males. China's One-Child Policy has
indirectly benefited the role of women in society.

Introduction
For thousands of years, sons have been highly revered in
Chinese culture. Sons were expected to carry on the honor of the family
name, wealth, and the expectation to provide for his parents. Males
dominated all aspects of Chinese life. In 1979, China introduced one of
the world's most extreme state mandated policies for population
control, one in which all married couples were to be restricted to having
only one child. Even immediately after its implementation, the Chinese
continued to believe in this cultural value in males.
Now, after thirty-two years of the One-Child Policy, those
who were born as an only child under the policy are becoming parents
themselves. As to be expected, some of these individuals were
daughters. Without having to compete with brothers, much more
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parental investment has been focused on these daughters in terms of
education, pride, and wealth. 'fhese daughters, who were the only child
in their family, have increasingly become active members of Chinese
society. Higher education levels have provided a means for women to
work in non-traditional jobs outside of the home. Women's earnings
can then be focused not only on their own offspring, but for their own
parents as well.
While China's One-Child Policy was first implemented to
curb such high population growth within the country, I purport that it
has inadvertently transformed the social structure within this society to
allow for Chinese women to experience greater gender equality.
Context in China
Male Preference
Traditionally, Chinese culture has placed high value on males
within the society. Confucian influence and the dominance of an
agricultural economy are both significant factors in the historical
promotion of the Chinese preference for large families, especially those
with many sons (Li and Cooney 1993:277-8). These sons are not only
viewed as the laborers of the family, they support the older generation.
They are perceived as the ones who continue the family line, tend the
ancestral shrine, and carry the honor of his family name. Couples feel
obligated to bear a son to be the heir of the family. In China and Hong
Kong during the 1950s and 1960s, there was a common name among
girls called die di, which translates "bring a younger brother" (Chan et
al. 2002:427). This expresses the commonality of the desire for sons
within the culture. Customarily, Chinese couples ensured having a son
by producing more children or marrying another wife. Infertile couples
tended to adopt a nephew with permission from a kinsman (Chan et al.
2002:427). Infertility or not having a son is viewed as a "curse in life"
by the Chinese (Chan et al. 2002:427).
For many years, Chinese couples have preferred sons over
daughters because males carry on the family name. This continuation of
the family tree is perceived to be a filial obligation. Family genograms
which can be found in the traditional ancestral halls most commonly
contain a list of all names of sons and grandsons (Chan et al.
2002:427). The names offefnale offspring are typically left out, as they
will later change their surname after becoming married. It is believed
that after these women are married, they belong to her husband and his
family . Parents rely heavily on their sons and daughters-in-law for old
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age security and carrying out funeral rituals when they die; hence,
families tend to invest more in their male offspring.
In addition, male preference is especially prominent among
those living in rural areas. This is because sons are valued to help in
farming and hard manual labor in order to support their family.
Approximately 70 percent of the population still lives in the rural areas
of China (Chan et al. 2002:427), which enhances this traditional male
preference even more.
The patriarchal system in China is also very dominant. Men
are among those who usually make all the major decisions in the
family. Gender roles were also very adamant within China, as men are
usually still the main source of financial income for the family and
women do not generally work outside the home. Chan et al. (2002)
notes that women are more likely to be in more casual and lower
paying jobs, with less opportunity for promotion, and more likely to be
laid off. Females also do not receive comparable benefits, such as
medical insurance, like their male counterparts.
Population Control
China's issue of gender preference was complicated even
more by the introduction of the One-Child Policy that was implemented
to control population growth in 1979. Over one-fifth of the world
population resides within China (Lai 2005:315). This unprecedented
population growth may in part be due to the Chinese Communist
Revolution in 1949, which provided better health care, decreasing
infant mortality and increasing life expectancy (Deutsch 2006:366-7).
China's population at the tum of the century was just over 1.2 billion
people, and is expected to peak at 1.6 billion by the year 2050 even
after the policy's implementation (Chan et al. 2002:428).
Given this expectation for high population growth even after
the policy was implemented, the Chinese government began to meet in
the mid-1970s to deter the deleterious effects of high population in a
country who was experiencing great economic hardship and a
collapsing environment. After the death of Mao and the rise of Deng
Xiaoping in the late 1970s, population studies and the planned control
of this growth became a crucial component of China's socialist
modernization (Greenhalgh 2003:167). By using concepts and ideas
with the planned economy, population scientists argued that the
population problem was incompatible with the economic and
demographic development within China (Greenhalgh 2003: 167).
Population became recognized as a national crisis; therefore, they relied
on drastic measures to counterbalance the well-being of the Chinese
45

people with economic, environmental and global ascent. From these
meetings, the government began employing different family planning
programs, one in which was the One-Child Policy itself. These strict
birth control procedures were implemented first in cities and areas of
high population density, and later all throughout China, especially for
those of the Han ethnic group who accounted for over 90 percent of the
total population (Lai 2005).
The Policy and Its Regulations
After understanding the context of the Chinese government
that was in place at the conception of the One-Child Policy, we can
now look at the policy and its regulations further in depth. Population
scientists provided the government with a policy to ensure drastic
changes within family planning. After the signing of China's OneChild Policy in 1979, all married urban couples were allowed to only
have one child. This creates a typical family of four grandparents and
two parents to one singleton child (also referred to as an only child).
This singleton child would therefore not be replacing the prior
generations, dramatically reducing the expected population growth
within the country. Enforcement of this policy is held at the provincial
level. For any additional child, the couple must pay a fme based upon
the province of residence, family income, etc.
In lieu of risking the chance of paying this large fee, couples
are encouraged to sign the One-Child Certificate. After pledging that
they will only have one child, the couple then becomes eligible for
certain benefits provided by the government, such as an allowance for
the child until he/she reaches the age of 14, longer maternity leaves,
priority access for hospitals and schools, and pensions for parents when
they reach old age (Zhang and sturm 1994:69). Couples who sign the
certificate, but then violate the policy not only lose these benefits, but
are also subject to penalties from the government. According to the
policy, these couples in violation were to be even more seriously
punished than those without the certificate at all. One sanction included
the return of all benefits the family had received upon signing the
certificate. In addition, the couple received an administrative sanction
from the government, which included a cut in the couple's salary or
demotion within a company, a denial of household registration status
for the baby, denial of graintrations, and the refusal of maternal leave
(Banister 1987; Cooney et al. 1991; Park and Han 1988; Tien 1991).
Though the ramifications stemming from this policy may
seem harsh for Chinese citizens, there are some exceptions to the OneChild Policy. While urban couples were permitted to have only one
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child, rural couples were allowed to have a second child under the
condition that their first child was a girl and they wait at least 3-4 years
(Liu et al. 2004:32). Ethnic minorities were also treated differently
under this policy, as they were allowed to have more than one child.
Ethnic groups with less than 10 million people (which included all 54
groups except the Zhuang ethnic group) were allowed to have two
children (Zhang 1998).
In addition to rural families and ethnic minorities, there were
also certain situations that remained exempt from this policy. If a
couple was to birth multiple children within one pregnancy, it would
still be perceived to follow the one-child (one-birth) rule. Additionally,
if the couple was to lose their only child to an early death, the couple is
allowed to have another child. The policy was more recently eased in
1984 when conditions were relaxed to allow couples made up of two
singleton children (both only children themselves) to have a second
child (Liu et al. 2004: 23).
Adaptations stemming from this policy
After the policy's implementation in 1979, many changes
accrued within Chinese society to cope with this significant change in
family planning. While some of these practices already existed and
increased in frequency, other practices were brought about in direct
response to this family planning policy. The challenges that Chinese
families faced brought about practices of sex-selective abortion,
infanticide, abandonment of children, undocumented children,
sterilization, an increase in fertility drugs, movement away from
Mainland China, and an unequal gender ratio.
First, sex-selective abortion became more prominent within
Chinese society during the 1980s when technological advancements
came to the medical field by enhancing the ultrasound equipment
(Miller 2001: 1089). Keeping in mind that Chinese families traditionally
desired sons and given the new strict family planning programs of only
being allowed one child, many of these were female-selective
abortions. To counteract these female-selective abortions, the Chinese
government banned hospitals from using ultrasound equipment and
revealing the sex of the child to its parents starting in 1993 (The
Christian Science Monitor 1995). Although Chinese laws were in place
that prohibited health care workers of informing the families about the
biological sex of the fetus, it appears that there is a lack of enforcement
and punishment when the information leaked (Lai 2005:324). It is
perceived that the total number of females aborted from 1980-2000 in
China is approximately 4 million (Miller 2001: 1086).
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Abortion is not the only practice to rid families of an
undesirable child. Infanticide, most commonly that of females, has also
become a common practice in China in response to the One-Child
Policy. While Divale and Harris (1976) purport that female-infanticide
is practiced as part of a system which reduces population growth in
societies where warfare is present, Dickemann (1979) thinks that
female-infanticide can be better explained as a cultural practice that
increases reproductive success. Instead, Hawkes (1981) argues that
female infanticide is best explained by synthesizing these two theories
when taking into account:
1) Relationships among populations and resources
2) The way this is organized economically and politically, with
special attention to the contribution having children makes to
perpetuation of these arrangements
3) The different constraints this imposes on the behavior of
women and men
[Hawkes 1981 :95]
Within China, the most common practice of a child's death
during the infancy stage is female infanticide. This can be attributed to
families who seek a son as their only child. This practice is especially
prevalent in rural areas, as couples prefer sons to daughters because
sons can assist in farm labor activities (Chan et al. 2002:427). This can
also occur in families allowed two children who already have two
children of the same sex and wish to have one of each. These infants
are then subjected to poor health care, lack of medical treatment,
malnourishment, etc.
Another adaptation stemming from this policy is the
abandonment of children, which again are most commonly girls. China
is estimated to have one million orphans, with nearly all of them being
girls (Chan et al. 2002:429). Many Chinese girls left in orphanages are
abandoned soon after birth, whereas most boys are abandoned after
realizing visible disabilities or illness of the child (Chan et al.
2002:429). Since most girls are abandoned soon after birth, the parents
do not register the child, as they can still use the childbearing permit to
try to conceive a boy (Chan et al. 2002:429). The annual number of
adoptions in China rose from less than 200,000 children adopted during
the 1970s to about 400,008 during 1984-86, which then progressed to
over 500,000 in 1987 (Johansson and Nygren 1991). This large
increase in adoptions can be in part to the greater number of children
available at orphanages, as well as a method to have another child in
48

the family without getting fined for noncompliance to the One-Child
Policy.
As stated earlier, some parents to not register their unwanted
child and abandon him or her, leaving them as undocumented children.
Other children may remain completely undocumented by the Chinese
government and still live with the family. Zeng et al. (1993) reported
that couples who already had two daughters and wanted a son could
bypass the rules of sterilization after two children by hiding the second
child or under-reporting people in the household to the government
entities. This may occur in provinces where the policy is not as strictly
enforced; however, this child's life becomes much more complicated
when dealing with any situations where governmental documentation is
involved.
Sterilization is another change in response to the policy, as it
has become the most prevalent method of contraception within China.
Approximately half of all women of reproductive age have reported
that either they or their husbands have been sterilized (Short et al.
2000:279). Sterilization is strongly promoted by the Chinese
government. In 1982, the Chinese government advocated sterilization
as the preferred method for couples with a second birth (Short et al.
2000:279).
While some couples have complied with the government's
family planning policy, others choose to avoid it. Some couples have
found this population control policy to contradict their own beliefs;
rather than adapting to the country's mandated policy, they move from
Mainland China so that the policy does not apply to them anymore.
Some immigrate to other nations where they are allowed more freedom
in their reproductive choices. Others move to Chinese territories such
as Hong Kong or Macau, who have been granted a 50 year grace period
after the transfer of colonial rule to Chinese rule. While these territories
will eventually come under Chinese rules and regulations, at this
moment they have their own government and policies in place. The
One-Child policy does not apply there; therefore, families are moving
from Mainland China in order to have more children.
Another way in which couples are resisting the One-Child
Policy to have more children is with the rise in fertility drugs. These
drugs have become widely available and more frequently used in order
to increase the chances of reproduction for couples with problems
conceiving, as well as enhancing opportunities for couples to have
multiple births within one pregnancy. As stated earlier, the birth of
mUltiples such as twins, triplets, quadruplets, etc. is exempt from the
One-Child Policy since it occurs from one pregnancy. In 2005, a
hospital in the eastern city ofNanjing reported a sharp increase in the
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number of twins and triplets delivered jumping from a yearly average
of20 sets to 90 sets (BBC News, 2005:1). The medical advancement of
fertility drugs has allowed couples to have better reproductive success,
despite the odds against them.
The final and maybe most controversial adaptation hailing
from the implementation of this policy is the unequal gender ratio
(Hesketh and Xing 2006). This unequal gender ratio may be attributed
to some of the aforementioned adaptations, such as female-selective
abortion, female infanticide, abandonment and undocumentation of
females. One way to measure gender ratio within a society is by
looking at the sex ratio at birth (SRB) which can be defined as "the
number of live males to females born to a population within a given
period, usually a year" (Lai 2005:313). In 1981, the sex ratio at birth
for the majority of provinces in Mainland China were slightly higher
than 106, which is the number generally regarded as the upper limit of
a normal SRB (Lai 2005:317).
After the subsequent census in 2000, it was found that the sex
ratio at birth increased to an extremely high level for all the provinces
except one, Xizang which had an SRB of97.43 favoring more females
than males. The highest SRB in 2000 was 138.01 in the province of
Jiangxi (Lai 2005:320). Additionally, the provinces of Anhui, Henan
and Guangdong had each an SRB greater than 130, with several other
provinces with an SRB close to 130 (Lai 2005:321). As demonstrated
through this census information, China has experienced a great shift in
the sex ratio at birth favoring more males than females. In addition,
female infanticide is also more common, which decreases the amount
of females within the society even more. There is a huge gap between
the amount of females and males within China, especially among those
born after the signing of the One-Child Policy in 1979.
Changes in Social Structure
The adaptations that have occurred in China following the
implementation of the One-Child Policy have also presented Chinese
society with changes in their social structure. Social structure can be
defined as "rule-governed relationships-with all their rights and
obligations-that hold members of a society together. This includes
households, families, associations, and power relations, including
politics" (Haviland et al. 2007:155). The aspects of Chinese social
structure that have transformed in light of the One-Child Policy are:
marriage, post-marital residence patterns, filial piety, patrilineality,
gender roles, and parental investment.
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As discussed earlier, there is an extreme difference in the ratio
of males to females within Chinese society, which has stemmed from
male preference practices such as female-selective abortion, female
infanticide and females placed in orphanages (which can possibly be
adopted from outside the country). This unequal gender ratio may cause
many problems for the availability of prospective spouses.
There may not be one universal definition of marriage that
applies to all societies; however, no matter who constitutes as the
spouses in the marriage union, (e.g. male-male, male-female, femalefemale, male-intersex, female-intersex, or multiple partners) there
usually tends to be a public ceremony recognizing this relationship, a
creation of ties between the two intermarrying families, and specific
rights and obligations for each spouse. Ember and Ember define
marriage as a "socially approved sexual and economic union, usually
between a woman and man" (2007:161). This union is considered to be
more or less permanent, whereby including reciprocal rights and
obligations between the two (or more) spouses, and between spouses
and their future children.
Historically, Chinese society has accepted monogamy as the
most common form of marriage; however, some forms of polygyny are
also present. With the scarcity of females within the population, should
China expect to see polyandrous marriage practices emerge? Given the
historical context of Chinese preference of sons and male dominance
and no current documentation of this practice within China, I believe
that the practice of polyandry is not very likely to occur. Instead, males
have been seeking females outside of their age range. In addition,
Guttentag and Secord (1983) suggest that societies with a relative
under-supply of women tend to value women more, and are
consequently less inclined to divorce.
While the structure of marriage has been transforming after
the creation of the One-Child Policy, so have post-marital residence
patterns (Hong 1987). Traditionally, Chinese couples tended to be
patrilocal, residing with or near the family of the husband. After 1979,
there are now more singleton children in China, each of which may
experience a heavy reliance from their parents since they have no other
siblings. Post-marital residence is one very important aspect of taking
care of one's parents in their old age in China.
In duo local residence, husband and wife do not live together
but in separate homes, which can be near the homes of their
own parents. In matri-patrilocal residence, the couple
alternates their place of residence. In spite of the apparent
fairness of the above alternatives, the choice in China is more

51

likely to be uxorilocal marriage, where the husband resides in
the wife's household [Hong, 1987: 321].
Just as both marriage and post-marital residence patterns have
transformed since the policy's implementation, another aspect of
Chinese social structure that has changes is filial piety. In a study
performed in the early 1990s, the average parent's ideal child possessed
'good moral character' which meant that the child demonstrated love
towards others, cooperation in a group setting, good manners, respect
for elders, obedience, and dongshi which stands for an understanding of
adults' desires (Wu, 1996). After examining the differences between
singleton children and children with siblings, Deutsch purports that
filial piety itself has not vanished with the coming of what was
perceived to be spoiled 'little emperors,' also known as singleton
children (Deutsch 2006:369). Instead, she found that only children were
just as likely as children with siblings to demonstrate as much concern
for and responsibility towards their parents, and even more emotional
closeness (Deutsch 2006:385). One important aspect of filial piety is to
provide for one's parents in their old age. Lai argues that the more
developed regions of China should provide some form of social
retirement arrangement, especially for families that have only one
daughter (2005:324). However, Deutsch notes that filial piety has
transformed into something relevant for singleton daughters. Daughters
who had no brothers to support their parents in old age began to
compensate for the brothers they lacked (2006:369). These daughters
began supporting their parents financially with the income they made,
and also are increasingly sharing the same place of residence with their
parents.
The patrilineal systems are also another aspect of China's
social structure that has changed due in part to the One-Child Policy.
Since singleton children will not have any nephews or nieces, and their
children will not have any uncles, aunts or first cousins, it will
consequently only take about 40 years for the newest member in the
family to find himlherselfwithout any collateral relatives within the
fifth degree, which are the traditional boundaries for Chinese lineages
(Hong 1987). This is assuming the couple, their child, and their
grandchild all marry in their early 20s and have their own offspring
shortly afterward. Therefore, the patrilineal network will be reduced to
only the direct lineal kin-patents, grandparents, and great grandparents
(Hong 1987:319). This decomposition ofpatrilineality is becoming
increasingly more prevalent as children born under the One-Child
Policy as an only child are becoming parents themselves.
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Another alteration found in the Chinese social structure is the
changing of gender roles within society. As long as women have to
invest most of their adult lives to childbearing, they are less likely to be
able to prepare and commit themselves to their gender-specific careers.
In contrast, if childbearing is reduced to a relatively short time period
early in their lives or perhaps completely eliminated, Chinese women
may find it more rewarding to prepare for and obtain careers
traditionally held by men in their society (Hong 1987). Cross cultural
studies have examined that a drastic decline in fertility is accompanied
by a large increase in women's labor force participation (Davis and van
den Oever 1982). However, this does not necessarily mean that the
women take over occupations that are heavily dominated by men.
Since the One-Child Policy reduces the amount of time spent
on childbearing, early marriage and early pregnancy would allow
women to be freed from child-rearing responsibilities at a relatively
young age (Hong 1987:323). Fong noted that among her survey
respondents, students expected the division of domestic work in their
own marriages to be more egalitarian than in their parents' marriages
(2002: 11 05). In addition to shared domestic work, it is now much more
acceptable for women to work outside the home and earn their own
income.
The final aspect of Chinese social structure that is essential to
examine is parental investment. The differential investment in offspring
can be further examined by the Trivers-Willard hypothesis which
predicts that high-status individuals will invest more in sons, and lowstatus individuals will invest more in daughters (Trivers 1972; Trivers
and Willard 1973). This hypothesis was first tested among species
different than our own, but has since been further supported by Cronk
(2000) who studied the Mukogodo of Kenya, a low-status group of
mothers who experiences high female-biased parental investment.
Furthermore, Irons (2000) has supporting research with his study of the
Y omut Turkmen of Central Asian Turkestan, who can be viewed as
high-status mothers with greater investment in sons than daughters.
Parental investment, as indicated by the Trivers-Willard
hypothesis not only applies to the sex ratio at birth. It also includes the
investment in offspring after birth, which may include nurturing of
children while they are young, in addition to parental investments in the
education, as well as social and cultural development of their children
(Hopcroft 2005: 1113). Though classical studies of gender in Chinese
societies is greatly dominated by the parental investment in males,
females born after China's One-Child Policy have no brothers to
compete with, and therefore receive greater parental investment
themselves. Fong argues that daughters without brothers are more
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likely to be encouraged to further their education and pursue
demanding occupations (2002: 1.099). In previous generations, the
greater studiousness of girls was limited, since their parents were
reluctant to invest money in their daughter's education. Sometimes they
even made daughters drop out of school to work and fund their
brother's education (Fong 2002: 1103). Brotherless daughters are they
are encouraged to strive academically and have successful careers since
they are their parents' only objects of investment, and consequently the
only hope for support in their old age (Fong 2002:1103).
Significance for Chinese Women
While much scholarship has been placed on the detrimental
effects of the One-Child Policy, what benefits have surfaced for the
Chinese people? Beyond the obvious social and economic advantages
of retarding the massive population growth, and subsequently
commensurating it with the economic development and availability of
resources, such as adequate food and fresh water, the One-Child Policy
has fueled a significant change for the benefit of Chinese women that
may ultimately outweigh its adverse effects (Hong 1987:318-9). This
policy may eliminate the right women have to control their own
reproduction, which has inadvertently encouraged female-selective
abortions and female infanticide; however, it also has the potential to
ironically allow Chinese women to achieve what was once held as an
unattainable goal of social equality.
Rosaldo (1974) believes this gender inequality can be
attributed to a universal opposition between the domestic orientation of
women and the orientation of predominately men into public spheres.
The fertility transition accompanied with modernization not only
enables but compels women to devote themselves to work and
education rather than only motherhood (Fong 2002). With the adoption
of a modern economy, China has seen an increase in women's
employment rates and diminishing parental bias against daughters as
they begin to earn money. After the One-Child Policy, China has
dramatically dropped in fertility. The total fertility rate was around 6
during the 1950s and 1960s, and by the end of the 1990s the total
fertility rate dropped to 1.22 (NBS 2002). This extreme decrease in
fertility has consequently produced empowerment among women.
As stated earlier, sing~ton daughters have no siblings, most
importantly brothers, to compete with for parental investment. Parents
of singleton daughters are now encouraging these young women to
strive academically, study abroad, and have a successful career. It has
become more widely accepted for women to work outside of the home,
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especially in urban areas. In 2007 Huang Qinghi, the vice-president of
the All-China Women's Federation Secretariat stated, "45 percent of
China's laborers were female, with over 4 million women living in
rural areas being lifted out of destitution" (Xinhua 2007: I). Not only
are women to work outside of the home, but they have also become
active members in politics. In 2007, the proportion of female officials
at various levels of government and provincial institutions is 40 percent
(Xinhua 2007:1). Chinese women are still not as likely as males to hold
higher positions; however, since 2001, five women have been promoted
to high profile positions (Xinhua 2007:1). Strides have been made
towards a more egalitarian society among men and women alike.
Conclusion
Since the signing of the One-Child Policy in 1979, the
preference for sons in China has been seriously challenged. While
some practices may have been used in this sex-selective process
immediately following its implementation, we are now beginning to see
those societal norms change. Specifically, the One-Child Policy may
transform society into a country which the patrilineal system may cease
to be a significant factor in everyday life (Hong 1987:319).
Strengths
One may already witness the strides women have made
towards gender equality within China, such as educational attainment,
career choices, and political participation. The patrilineal kinship
system is disintegrating, just as the filial piety has been transformed
into something that is compatible with singleton daughters. Marriage
and post-marital residence patterns have also adapted to the shift in
popUlation demographics following the One-Child Policy. Parental
investment has also become something not only reserved for sons, as
some parents do not have any sons in which they can invest. Daughters
have seen a transformation occur that has allowed resources to be
allocated for their own success. Chinese daughters born prior to the
One-Child Policy were severely hindered by the norms within the
society. In contrast, singleton daughters today enjoy exceptional
support for their effort to challenge preconceived norms working
against them (Fong 2002). Since these daughters are no longer
systematically excluded from familial and societal resources, females
have been able to prosper towards a more egalitarian society.
Limitations
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While educational attainment, career choice, and political
participation following the One-Child Policy may very well constitute
as support for better gender equality in China, it is still unclear what
impact other factors have played in promoting gender equality. For
example, globalization may be a subordinate means for this gender
equality to emerge. Other countries, as well as organizations like the
United Nations have promoted gender equality throughout the world.
The developed countries have recognized women with an allocation of
rights, as well as counteracting discrimination against these women. In
addition, how significant of a role did the overturn of the government in
1949 to become the People's Republic of China play in promoting
gender equality? Feminist movements were introduced during this
period, in reflection to other feminist movements going on around the
world in years prior.
Others may argue that China still has not experienced gender
equality, and Chinese society still has a very dominant preference for
males. While this may hold true in some aspects, I believe that this is a
developmental process and cannot change overnight. By taking small
steps to ensure women's rights and access to education and other
resources, we will see more progressive advancements of gender
equality in the future.
Suggestions for Further Research
Previous studies have argued that the significance of Chinese
cultural norms on childbearing has been weakened by socioeconomic
development and modernization. It was viewed culturally acceptable to
bear many children, with the importance being held on sons. However,
it has been difficult to locate any published studies in English with
empirical data systematically testing the interaction between son
preference and socioeconomic development. The Trivers-Willard
Hypothesis should be tested in this specific country to report and
adverse effects it has had on the population over time. A longitudinal
study would be very beneficial in this situation; however, it may be too
late to document this. I also think a comparative study between rural
and urban populations would be valuable and necessary. Earlier
research has focused on the role of governmental control in urban areas
with a lack of this same cOittrol in rural areas. What effects has this
played in the social structure and gender equality of both rural and
urban areas of China?
In addition, I have not been able to locate any previous studies
with empirical data studying the role adoption has played, perhaps as a
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strategy to circumvent the One-Child Policy. It would be interesting to
see how many couples adopted children that were not their own
biological children, so that they could reach the desired amount of
children within their family.
It is also still unclear what the future holds for such an uneven
gender ratio. For those born under the One-Child Policy, there is in
extreme gap in the availability for females to males. What will this
mean for potential marriage partners, the frequency of same-sex
marriage, and those who will not marry or produce any child(ren) at
all?
In Summary
Most scholars have focused much of their time studying the
hardships created by China's One-Child Policy. Those that do express
benefits typically only speak of the lower population and what
advantages it has given families and Chinese society as a whole.
However, little scholarship has focused on hidden unintentional effects
this policy has had on the promotion of gender equality. This review of
literature has allowed for a less prominent benefit to surface, one in
which Chinese society no longer holds such a disparity between males
and females . While China's One-Child Policy was first implemented to
curb such high population growth within the country, it has
inadvertently transformed the social structure to allow for Chinese
women to progress towards greater gender equality.
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